OPT Partnerships at Firm-Level: a `Learning Approach'
The picture of OPT relations is very different at ®rm-level and in aggregate statistical terms. Thus it is necessary to go beyond a statistical analysis and conduct a more qualitative assessment of the very nature of OPT partnerships that are concluded between EU and CEECs ®rms. The `aggregate' dependence of CEECs' trade on OPT, highlighted in Chapter 2's statistical section, corresponds to a `microeconomic' dependence of local ®rms on their foreign OPT partners which can take many different forms. It is important to understand the nature of these OPT inter-®rm relations as they coincide with different opportunities for CEECs' ®rms to take advantage of the measure. In fact, they trigger different `learning mechanisms' which are important factors determining the chances that CEECs transition economies have to catch up. This chapter thus identi®es different possible types of OPT partnerships mainly on the basis of ®eldwork analysis carried out with local ®rms in the T&C and electrical machinery sectors in the Czech Republic and in Hungary.
An approach to OPT at ®rm-level
The above statistical evidence suggests that OPT has had a bene®cial effects on CEECs' trade performance. The measure was indeed instrumental in helping the process of CEECs' trade reorientation towards EU markets. However, going beyond a mere trade approach and examining the corporate networks which give rise to OPT trade ¯ows yields a rather more mitigated assessment. In fact, regarding the question of the terms under which OPT integrates CEECs' production facilities, no simple and de®nitive answer is to be proposed. If the measure has been so successful, it is no doubt because this provides ®rms with appropriate solutions to their respective problems. However, the OPT mechanisms also raise much concern about the way in which this measure integrates local ®rms into the Western corporate sphere.
Pros and cons at ®rm-level
At ®rst, OPT appears to have been a providential solution to many of the problems that faced CEECs at the dawn of their economic transformation process in 1991. In particular, OPT has been decisive in helping to ®ll often huge production capacities left with no raison d'e Ãtre by the sudden demise of the CMEA (COMECON) in 1991. In addition, OPT has offered a solution to the shortage of good quality input necessary for successfully weathering international competition. The measure has also facilitated CEECs' access to EU markets. Indeed, OPT eases trade restrictions set up by the EU which would otherwise dissuade exports to the Community. Besides, OPT offers a means for exporting abroad without having to ful®l often very demanding conditions in order to penetrate local distribution channels. Furthermore, OPT is an ideal solution to the problem of `adverse selection' that forces producers with no popular trademark to ®x their prices lower than if their brand were renowned. Last but not least, OPT is a straightforward solution to solving the dif®culties pertaining to lack of managerial experience in the ®eld of international relations.
The price to pay for the above advantages, however, is costly in terms of independence. A local ®rm engaging in OPT activities has to sacri®ce its market power to the bene®t of its foreign partner as it becomes dependent on the latter, ®rst, for inputs, and second, to market the output. Additionally, a series of mechanisms exists which actually deepens the state of dependence of local ®rms, making it dif®cult for them to recover autonomy. For example, the fact that goods produced under an OPT agreement are traded under the trademark of the EU partner prevents a local brand from gaining the recognition necessary for potential subsequent autonomous penetration of foreign markets. This is particularly pernicious as the ability of a local partner to take over production on his own in the case of withdrawal of an EU ®rm is seriously jeopardised.
Another drawback is that OPT concerns often very simple and labourintensive transformation tasks. These may potentially neglect or even erode the potential technological capabilities of local partners, forcing the latter to specialise in labour-intensive goods. What is more, it can be argued that the pro®tability conditions attached to OPT are likely to be unfavourable. For example, if the depreciation of machines used in the production process is not taken into account in the computation underlying an OPT contract, margins of pro®t decrease with time. The life span of the machinery then determines the end of the co-operation
